In barter exchanges, participants directly trade their endowed goods in a constrained economic setting without money. Transactions in barter exchanges are often facilitated via a central clearinghouse that must match participants even in the face of uncertainty-over participants, existence and quality of potential trades, and so on. Leveraging robust combinatorial optimization techniques, we address uncertainty in kidney exchange, a real-world barter market where patients swap (in)compatible paired donors. We provide two scalable robust methods to handle two distinct types of uncertainty in kidney exchange-over the quality and the existence of a potential match. The latter case directly addresses a weakness in all stochastic-optimization-based methods to the kidney exchange clearing problem, which all necessarily require explicit estimates of the probability of a transaction existing-a still-unsolved problem in this nascent market. We also propose a novel, scalable kidney exchange formulation that eliminates the need for an exponential-time constraint generation process in competing formulations, maintains provable optimality, and serves as a subsolver for our robust approach. For each type of uncertainty we demonstrate the benefits of robustness on real data from a large, fielded kidney exchange in the United States. We conclude by drawing parallels between robustness and notions of fairness in the kidney exchange setting.
Introduction
Real-world optimization problems face various types of uncertainty that impact both the quality and feasibility of candidate solutions. Uncertainty in combinatorial optimization is especially troublesome: if the existence of certain constraints or variables is uncertain, identifying a good-or even feasible-solution can be extremely difficult. Stochastic optimization approaches endeavor to maximize the expected objective value, under uncertainty. While sometimes successful, stochastic optimization relies heavily on a correct characterization of uncertainty; furthermore, stochastic approaches are often intractable-especially in combinatorial domains (Bertsimas et al. 2011a) . A complementary approach is robust optimization, which protects against worst-case outcomes. Robust approaches can be less sensitive to the exact characterization of uncertainty, and are often far more tractable than stochastic approaches (Ben-Tal et al. 2009 ). This paper addresses uncertainty in kidney exchange, a realworld barter market where patients with end-stage renal disease enter and trade their willing paired kidney donors (Rapaport 1986; Roth et al. 2004) . Kidney exchange is a relatively new paradigm for organ allocation, but already accounts for over 10% of living kidney donations in the United States, and is growing in popularity worldwide (Biró et al. 2017) . Modern exchanges also include non-directed donors (NDDs), who enter the market without a paired patient and donate their kidney without receiving one in return. Computationally, kidney exchange is a packing problem: solutions (matchings) consist of cyclic organ swaps and NDD-initiated donation chains in a directed compatibility graph, representing all participants and potential transactions. Each potential transplant is given a numerical weight by policymakers; the objective is to select cycles and chains that maximize overall matching weight. In general, this problem is NP-hard (Abraham et al. 2007; Biró et al. 2009 ); however, many efficient deterministic formulations exist that are fielded now and clear real exchanges (Abraham et al. 2007; Manlove and O'Malley 2015; Anderson et al. 2015; Dickerson et al. 2016; 2018) .
Uncertainty in kidney exchange. Presently-fielded kidney exchange algorithms largely do not address uncertainty. Here, we consider two types of uncertainty in kidney exchange: over the quality of the transplant (weight uncertainty) and over the existence of potential transplants (existence uncertainty). Policymakers assign weights to potential transplants, which are (imperfect) estimates of transplant quality; weight uncertainty stems from both measurement uncertainty (e.g., medical compatibility and kidney quality) and uncertainty in the prioritization of some patients over others. Transplant existence is always uncertain: matched transplants "fail" before executing for a variety of reasons, severely impacting a planned kidney exchange. To address both cases, we propose uncertainty sets containing different realizations of the uncertain parameters. We then develop a scalable robust optimization approach, and demonstrate its success on data from a large fielded kidney exchange.
Robust optimization is a popular approach to optimization under uncertainty, with applications in reinforcement learning (Petrik and Subramanian 2014) , regression (Xu et al. 2009 ), classification (Chen et al. 2017 , and network optimization (Mevissen et al. 2013) . Motivated by real-world con-straints, we apply robust optimization to kidney exchange-a graph-based market clearing or resource allocation problem.
Our Contributions. To our knowledge, weight uncertainty has not been addressed in the kidney exchange literature. Our approach is similar to that of Bertsimas and Sim (2004) and Poss (2014) , and uses some of their results. Several approaches have been proposed for existence uncertainty, primarily based on stochastic optimization (Dickerson et al. 2016; Anderson et al. 2015; Dickerson et al. 2018) or hierarchical optimization (Manlove and O'Malley 2015) . The primary disadvantage of these approaches-in addition to tractability-is their reliance on, and sensitivity to, the explicit estimation of the probability of each particular potential transplant. This probability is extremely difficult to determine (Dickerson et al. 2018; Glorie 2012) , and prevents the translation of those methods into practice. Our approach uses a simpler notion of edge existence uncertainty-an upperbound on the number of non-existent edges-which is easier to interpret and estimate. Glorie (2014) proposed a related robust formulation that is exponentially larger than ours, and is intractable for realistically-sized exchanges.
In addition, we introduce a new scalable formulation for kidney exchange that combines concepts from two state-ofthe-art formulations (Anderson et al. 2015; Dickerson et al. 2016) , handles long or uncapped NDD-initiated chains without requiring expensive constraint generation, and ties into a developed literature on fairness in kidney exchangethus addressing use cases that are becoming more common in fielded exchanges (Anderson et al. 2015) .
Preliminaries
Model for kidney exchange. A kidney exchange can be represented formally by a directed compatibility graph G = (V, E). Here, vertices v ∈ V represent participants in the exchange, and are partitioned as V = P ∪ N into P , the set of all patient-donor pairs, and N , the set of all NDDs (Roth et al. 2004; 2005; Abraham et al. 2007) . Each potential transplant from a donor at vertex u to a patient at vertex v is represented by a directed edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, which has an associated weight w e ∈ w; weights are set by policymakers, and reflect both the medical utility of the transplant, as well as ethical considerations (e.g., prioritizing patients by waiting time, age, and so on). Cycles in G correspond to cyclic trades between multiple patient-donor pairs in P ; chains, correspond to donations that begin with an NDD in N and continue through multiple patient-donor pairs in P . The kidney exchange clearing problem is to select a feasible set of transplants (edges in E) that maximize overall weight. Let M be the set of all feasible matchings (i.e., solutions) to a kidney exchange problem; the general formulation of this problem is max x∈M x · w, where binary decision variables x represent edges, or cycles and chains. This problem is NP-and APX-hard (Abraham et al. 2007; Biró et al. 2009 ).
Robust optimization. Robust optimization is a common approach to optimization under uncertainty, which is often more tractable and requires less accurate uncertainty information than other approaches (Bertsimas et al. 2011a ). This approach begins by defining an uncertainty set U for the uncertain optimization parameter; U contains different realizations of this parameter. Consider the example of edge weight uncertainty: we might design an edge weight uncertainty set U w that contains the realized (i.e. "true") edge weightsŵ with high probability, P (ŵ ∈ U w ) ≥ 1 − , for 0 < 1. The parameter is referred to as the protection level, and is often used to control the number of realizations in U.
After designing U, the robust approach finds the best solution, assuming the worst-case realization within U. For kidney exchange (a maximization problem), this corresponds to a minimization over U; for example, Problem (1) is the robust formulation with uncertain edge weights. 
The robustness of this approach depends on the proportion of possible realizations contained in U. If U contains all possible realizations, the approach may be too conservative; if U only contains one possible realization ofŵ, the solution may be too myopic. The number of realizations in U is often controlled by a parameter: either an uncertainty budget Γ, or the protection level . Next we introduce the first type of uncertainty considered in this paper: edge weight uncertainty.
Optimization in the Presence of Edge Weight Uncertainty
Edge weights in kidney exchange represent the medical and social utility gained by a single kidney transplant. Weights are determined by policymakers, and are subject to several types of uncertainty. 1 Part of this uncertainty is due to insufficient knowledge of the future: a patient or donor's health may change, raising or lowering the "true" weight of their transplant edges. Another type of uncertainty stems from disagreement between policymakers regarding the social utility of a transplant. For example, some policymakers might prioritize young patients over older patients; other policymakers might prioritize the sickest patients above all healthier patients. Policymakers aggregate these value judgments to assign a single weight to each transplant edge, but this aggregation is a contentious and imperfect process (although recent work from the AI community has begun to address this using techniques from computational social choice and machine learning (Freedman et al. 2018; Noothigattu et al. 2018) ). Still, there is no way to measure the "true" social utility of a transplant, and therefore this uncertainty is not easily measured.
Interval weight uncertainty. It is beyond the scope of this work to characterize these sources of uncertainty. We simply assume that the nominal edge weights w, provided by policymakers, are an uncertain estimate of the realized edge weightsŵ, i.e., the "true" value of each transplant. Next, we formalize edge weight uncertainty and our robust approach. This section focuses on edge weights, so we write our for-mulations with decision variables x e ∈ x corresponding to individual edges.
We assume that realized edge weightsŵ are random variables with a partially known symmetric distribution, centered about the nominal weights w. This assumption implies that E[ŵ] = w, thus a non-robust approach that maximizes w is equivalent to a stochastic optimization approach that maximizes expected edge weight. We refer to this edge uncertainty model as interval uncertainty. Definition 1 (Interval Edge Weight Uncertainty). Letŵ e be the realized weight of edge e, with nominal weight w e , and maximum discount 0 ≤ d e ≤ w e . Letŵ e ≡ w e + d e α e , where α e is the fractional deviation of edge e. Both α e andŵ e are continuous random variables, symmetrically distributed on [−1, 1] and [w e − d e , w e + d e ] respectively.
Each discount factor d e should reflect the level of uncertainty in w e . If w e is known exactly, then d e = 0; if w e is very uncertain, then we might set d e = w e , or higher.
To vary the degree of uncertainty, we use an uncertainty budget Γ, which limits the total deviation from nominal edge weights. With our uncertainty model, it is natural to let Γ limit the total fractional deviation of each edge weight-i.e., sum of all α e . This uncertainty set U I Γ is defined as:
For example if Γ = 3, there may be three edges with |α e | = 1, or one edge with |α e | = 1 and four edges with |α e | = 1/2, and so on.
Choosing an appropriate Γ is not straightforward. Matchings often use only a small fraction of the decision variables (e.g., transplant edges), and it is difficult to predict the size of the optimal matching. Intuitively, Γ should reflect the size of the final matching: for example if we assume that half of any matching's edges will be discounted, then we should set Γ |x|/2. Generalizing this concept, we define a variablebudget uncertainty set U I γ , with budget function γ(|x|).
Next, to define γ, we relate it to a much more intuitive parameter: the protection level .
Uncertainty Budget γ and Protection Level
The protection level mediates between a completely conservative approach, and the non-robust approach: as → 0 the approach becomes more conservative, and = 1 corresponds to a non-robust approach. In this section we relate γ to , beginning with the following Theorem 1. Theorem 1 (Adapted from Theorem 3 of (Bertsimas and Sim 2004) ). For a matching x ∈ M with |x| edges, and uncertainty set U I Γ , the probability that U I Γ contains the realized edge weights for x is bounded below by
with η = (Γ + |x|)/2 and µ = η − η . That is, for some , if Γ is chosen such that = B(|x|, Γ), then the inequality P (ŵ ∈ U I Γ ) ≥ 1 − holds by Theorem 1. Next, we use this result to define a variable uncertainty budget function γ, using the intuitive definition introduced by Poss (2014): for matching x ∈ M and protection level , we find the minimum Γ such that B(|x|, Γ) ≤ . If this is not possible (i.e., the matching is too small, or is too small), then γ = |x|. This budget function is defined as:
It may not be clear how to solve the edge weight robust problem with this variable uncertainty budget. We use the approach of Poss (2014), which solves the variable-budget robust problem by solving several instances of the constantbudget robust problem; details of this approach can be found in Appendix A.4. Thus, to solve the variable-budget robust problem we first solve the constant-budget robust problem.
Constant-Budget Edge Weight Robust Approach
We now describe our approach to the constant-budget edge weight robust problem; a full discussion and derivation can be found in Appendix A. We need to solve Problem (1) with edge weight uncertainty set U I Γ . This requires a minimization of the objective, overŵ ∈ U I Γ , followed by a maximization over matchings in M.
First we directly minimize the objective of Problem (1) over U I Γ . That is, for any matching x ∈ M, we find the minimum objective value for any realized edge weights in U I Γ , denoted by Z(x):
Thus, solving the robust problem corresponds to maximizing Z(x) over all feasible matchings. Our approach to doing so is as follows. First, we linearize Z(x) using several new variables and constraints; we then add these to an existing kidney exchange formulation (Dickerson et al. 2016) . The complete linear formulations of Z(x) and Problem (1) are given in Appendix A.2, but are omitted here for space. Our robust formulation is scalable-it has a polynomial count of variables and constraints, regardless of finite chain cap; on realistic exchanges it takes only a few seconds to solve. We demonstrate our method's impact on match composition in Section 5, and show how it effectively controls for the impact of robustness using protection level .
Optimization in the Presence of Edge Existence Uncertainty
In this section we consider edge existence uncertainty, where an algorithmic match must be chosen before the full real-
Figure 1: Sample exchange graph with a 5-chain and two 2-cycles. The NDD is denoted by n, and each patient (and her associated donor) is denoted by p i (d i ). A maximumcardinality matching algorithm would select the 5-chain, denoted with dashed edges; however, the smaller matching consisting of two disjoint 2-cycles, shown with solid edges, may be more robust to edge failure.
ization of edges is revealed. Algorithmically-matched transplants in a kidney exchange can fail before transplantation for a variety of reasons: a patient may become too ill to undergo transplantation, or pre-transplantation testing may reveal that a patient is incompatible with her planned donor kidney. Furthermore, some edges are more likely to fail than others (e.g., edges into particularly sick patients). Edge failure significantly impacts fielded exchanges-with failure rates above 50% in many cases (Dickerson et al. 2018; Anderson et al. 2015; Ashlagi et al. 2013) . For illustration, consider the simple exchange in Figure 1 with two potential matchings: single 5-chain initiated by the NDD, or two 2-cycles (with pairs {1, 4} and {2, 5}). The 5-chain matches the most patient, but is less robust to edge failures. Consider the worst-case outcome for each matching, when 1 edge is guaranteed to fail: with the 5-chain, in the worst-case the first edge fails, causing the entire chain to fail; with the 2-cycles, a single edge failure only causes a single cycle to fail, leaving the other cycle complete. With this notion of edge existence uncertainty (which we define later), the 2-cycles are more robust than the 5-chain.
Managing edge failure in kidney exchange has been addressed in the AI and optimization literature in applicationspecific (Manlove and O'Malley 2015; Chen et al. 2012) or stochastic-optimization-based (Dickerson et al. 2018; 2016; Anderson et al. 2015; Klimentova et al. 2016) ways. These failure-aware approaches associate with each edge a predetermined failure probability p e ; these probabilities are used to then maximize expected matching score, possibly subject to some recourse actions. This stochastic approach is tractable when p e is identical for each edge. Our work addresses two major drawbacks of the failure-aware approach. First, when each edge has a unique p e , those models require enumerating every cycle and chain, which is intractable for large graphs or long chains. Second, the failure-aware approach is very sensitive to p e (as discussed in, e.g., §4.4 of Dickerson et al. (2018) ). In practice, precise values of p e are not known, thus the failure-aware approach can easily produce unreliable results. We use a simpler notion of edge existence uncertainty, which assumes that in any matching, the number of edges is bounded by a constant (Γ). This parameter is intuitive and simple to estimate from past exchanges.
To our knowledge, ours is the first scalable robust optimization approach to edge existence uncertainty in kidney exchange. Glorie (2014) develops several elegant robust methods for edge existence uncertainty, but requires that all cycles and chains are found during pre-processing and stored in memory. The number of chains grows exponentially in both the number of edges and the maximum chain length; thus, these approaches are intractable for exchanges involving more than a few dozen patient-donor pairs and NDDs.
Edge existence uncertainty. Here we briefly describe our robust approach to edge existence uncertainty; a full discussion and derivation can be found in Appendix B. For ease of exposition, in this section, decision variables x c ∈ x correspond to cycles and chains rather than edges. We use the following model of edge existence uncertainty. Definition 2 (Γ-Failures Edge Existence Uncertainty). Up to Γ edges may fail in any matching. After failures occur, the realized exchange graph isĜ = (V,Ê), such that edgeŝ E ⊆ E succeed and remain in existence, while all other edges fail and do not exist.
With this notion of uncertainty, without regard to computational or memory constraints, a stochastic-optimization-based approach could identify the best matching over all possible realizationsĜ (Anderson et al. 2015) . This is clearly intractable, as the number of realized graphs is exponential in |E|. Instead, we take a robust optimization approach by maximizing the worst-case (minimum) matching score over a set of realizable graphsĜ in an uncertainty set U. Like the stochastic approach, the robust approach considers a huge number of realizationsĜ; however the robust approach is far more tractable, as it need only find the worst-case realization and need not represent all realizable graphs explicitly.
Uncertainty set. Let F ⊆ E be the subset of failed edges for a realized graphĜ; thus,Ê = E \ F is the set of realized edges. Equation (3) defines uncertainty set U ex Γ in this way: up to Γ edges may fail (i.e., |F | ≤ Γ).
In kidney exchange, one edge failure can cause other edge failures: if one cycle edge fails, all edges in the cycle also fail; edge failure in a chain causes all subsequent chain edges to also fail. This leads to a notion of weight uncertainty for cycles and chains, where the realized weight of a cycle or chainŵ c may be smaller than nominal weight w c . Let α c be a discount parameter for cycle or chain c, such that w c = w c (1 − α c ). For example, if any edge fails in cycle c, then the entire cycle fails and α c = 0. We define the cycle/chain weight uncertainty set U w Γ in this way:
This uncertainty set is less intuitive than U ex Γ , but more suited to the robust approach. In Appendix B we show that U w Γ and U ex Γ are equivalent for integer Γ, and thus can be used for our robust approach.
Robust Optimization Approach
In this section we briefly describe our robust approach; for a full discussion and derivation, please see Appendix B. Our robust formulation for uncertainty set U w Γ follows a similar approach to Section 3. First, we directly minimize the kidney exchange objective over U w Γ , for some feasible solution x ∈ M. We express this minimization as a function Z(x): in effect, Z(x) discounts the Γ largest-weight cycles and chains. We then linearize Z(x) using several variables and constraints-this requires a formulation with variables tracking individual total chain weights-which is not possible in any existing compact kidney exchange formulations. For this purpose, we introduce a new kidney exchange formulation.
The PI-TSP formulation. We propose the position-indexed TSP formulation (PI-TSP); for details, please see Appendix B. Our formulation combines innovations from the two leading kidney exchange clearing approaches: PICEF (Dickerson et al. 2016) and PC-TSP (Anderson et al. 2015) . PICEF introduced an indexing schema that enables a more compact formulation in the context of long chains; our formulation builds on this to allow tracking of individual chain weights, a necessity that PICEF could not do. PC-TSP builds on techniques from the prize-collecting travelling salesperson problem (Balas 1989) to provide a tight linear programming relaxation; in general, the PC-TSP formulation has exponentially many constraints and thus requires constraint generation to solve. Our formulation uses an efficient version of position indexing that also requires only O(|E|)+O(|V |·|N |) constraints. Unlike PICEF, our formulation does not grow with the chain cap L: PICEF uses O(|V | 3 ) variables (when L → |V |); for large graphs, the PICEF model becomes too large to fit into memory (Dickerson et al. 2016) . Our formulation uses a fixed number of variables-O(|V | 2 )-for any chain cap, alleviating this memory problem. This is especially relevant to existing exchanges, as long chains can significantly increase efficiency in kidney exchange (Ashlagi et al. 2012) . PI-TSP uses the following parameters:
• G: kidney exchange graph, • C: a set of cycles on exchange graph G, • L: chain cap (maximum number of edges used in a chain), • w e : edge weights for each edge e ∈ E, • w C c : cycle weights for each cycle c ∈ C, and the following decision variables:
• p e ≥ 1: the position of edge e in any chain,
• p v ≥ 1: the position of patient-donor vertex v in any chain,
•p e ≥ 0: equal to p e if e is used in a chain, and 0 otherwise,
• z c ∈ {0, 1}: 1 if cycle c is used in the matching, and 0 otherwise, • y e ∈ {0, 1}: 1 if edge e is used in a chain, and 0 otherwise, v : chain flow into and out of vertex v ∈ P , from the chain starting with NDD n ∈ N . The PI-TSP formulation with chain cap L is given in Problem 4. We use the notation δ − (v) for the set of edges into vertex v and δ + (v) for the set of edges out of v.
The ability to express individual chain weights as decision variables has applications beyond robustness. For particularly valuable NDDs (such as those with so-called "universal donor" blood-type O), exchanges may enforce a minimum chain length or chain weight, to ensure that these rare NDDs are not "used up" on short chains; such a policy was formerly used by the United Network for Organ Sharing (Dickerson et al. 2012), using a much less scalable form of optimization-that also does not consider uncertaintythan our approach (Abraham et al. 2007) . Such a policy can be implemented efficiently with PI-TSP, inefficiently with PC-TSP, and not with PICEF, where decision variables do not indicate from which NDD a chain originated. In Appendix B we show-using real kidney exchange data-that PI-TSP can enforce a minimum chain length, and that this restriction has almost no impact on overall matching score.
Experimental Results
In this section, we compare each robust formulation against the leading non-robust formulation, PICEF (Dickerson et al. 2016) , with varying levels of uncertainty. These experiments use real exchange graphs collected from the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS)-a large US-wide kidney exchange with over 160 participating transplant centersbetween 2010 and 2016, as well simulated exchanges generated from known patient statistics using the standard method (Dickerson et al. 2018 ).
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For each exchange, we calculate the optimal non-robust matching M OPT (with total score |M OPT |), and the robust matching M R , for varying uncertainty budgets. We then draw many realizations of the exchange graph, based on the uncertainty model, and calculate the realized scores of the robust matching |M R | and non-robust matching |M NR |. We are primarily interested in the fractional dif-
We calculate ∆OPT (M R ) and ∆OPT (M NR ) for N = 400 realizations, and compare the robust and non-robust approaches. In rare cases the optimal matching is empty (i.e., there is no solution, or the uncertainty budget exceeds the matching size), we exclude these exchanges from the results.
Edge Weight Uncertainty We begin by exploring the impact on match utility of robust approaches to managing edge weight uncertainty. Here, each edge is randomly labeled as probabilistic (P) or deterministic (D). P edges receive weight 0 or 1 with probability 0.5, while D edges always receive weight 0.5; thus, expected edge weight is always 0.5. The non-robust approach maximizes expected edge weight, making this a kind of stochastic approach. The robust approach considers the discount value (0 or 0.5) of each edge, and avoids edges with a positive discount value. To vary the level of uncertainty, we vary the fraction of P edges (α). Each realization is drawn by assigning the P edges to have weight either 0 or 1.
We compute M R for protection levels ∈ {10 −4 , 10 −3 , 10 −2 , 10 −1 , 0.5}, and then calculate both ∆OPT (M R ) and ∆OPT (M NR ). Figure 2 shows ∆OPT on realistic 64-vertex simulated graphs (left) and larger (typically 150-300-vertex) real UNOS graphs (right); these figures show results for each protection level and for various α. Note that M NR does not depend on , and thus the non-robust results are shown as (constant) dashed lines.
The robust approach guarantees a better worst-case (minimum) ∆OPT , but results in a lower median ∆OPT . The protection level controls the robustness of our approach; smaller protects against more uncertain outcomes, but at greater cost to nominal behavior. As → 1, the robust approach protects against fewer bad outcomes, and approaches the behavior of non-robust.
Edge Existence Uncertainty We now address edge existence uncertainty, and compare the robust and non-robust approaches with Γ edge failures, for Γ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Each Γ corresponds to a different notion of uncertainty, such that exactly Γ edges fail.
3 For each Γ, we calculate M R , and draw N = 400 realizations by failing Γ edges in the matching.
We calculate ∆OPT for each realization, and compare these results for the robust and non-robust matchings. With edge existence uncertainty, the worst-case outcome is almost always an empty matching (∆OPT () = −1). Thus, rather than compare the worst-case ∆OP T , we compare the distribution of ∆OPT for each approach: we treat ∆OPT as a random variable, and use three simple statistical tests to demonstrate that-as expected-the robust approach produces more conservative and predictable results.
First, we use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to determine that the robust and non-robust approaches produce a different distribution of ∆OPT . For each Γ, this test produces p-values well below 10 −3 , indicating that the distributions of ∆OPT are different for the robust and non-robust approach. Second, for all exchanges and all Γ, the mean ∆OPT is typically 1% higher, and the standard deviation 1-2% lower for the robust approach. That is, the robust approach more consistently produces higher-weight solutions.
Third, we visualize the difference between these distributions using their histograms. Figure 3 shows the bin-wise difference between the histograms of ∆OPT (robust minus non-robust), with mean ∆OPT for non-robust shown as a dotted line. In these plots, the height of the bars indicate the change in probability density due to robustness. On all plots, the bars are negative for high and low values of ∆OPT , meaning that the robust matching is less likely to have an abnormally high or low ∆OPT . The bars are positive when ∆OPT is near its mean non-robust value-meaning that the robust matching is more likely to have a ∆OPT near the mean non-robust value. This is exactly the desired behavior: robustness produces more predictable and less varied results. In this application robustness exceeds expectations: the robust approach achieves a lower variance, and slightly improves nominal performance.
Robustness as Fairness
Balancing efficiency and fairness is a classic economic problem; recently, a body of literature covering fairness in kidney exchange has developed in the AI/Economics (Dickerson et al. 2014; McElfresh and Dickerson 2018; Ashlagi et al. 2013; Ding et al. 2018 ) and medical ethics (Gentry et al. 2005) communities; Appendix C presents a more thorough discussion. We now draw connections between robustness and fairness in kidney exchange. We show that budgeted edge weight uncertainty generalizes weighted fairness in kidney exchange, a generalization of "priority point" systems used in practice (see, e.g., (UNOS 2015) ). Though seemingly unrelated, fairness and robustness share a key characteristic: the balance between two competing properties. Fairness rules in kidney exchange often mediate between a fair and efficient outcome, using a parameter to set the balance. Similarly, robustness mediates between a good nominal outcome with the worst- case outcome, using an uncertainty budget or protection level to set that balance.
In kidney exchange, fairness most often refers to the prioritization of both pediatric and highly-sensitized patients, who are unlikely to find a match due to medical characteristics that make them incompatible with nearly all potential donors. In the weighted fairness approach, edges that represent transplants to prioritized patients receive additional edge weight, making them more likely to be matched by standard algorithms; versions of this prioritization scheme are used by most exchanges, including UNOS. To generalize weighted fairness, let each edge have a priority weight w e ∈ [0, ∞), equal to the nominal weight w e multiplied by a factor (1 + α e ), with α e ∈ [−1, ∞). For example, we might set α e > 0 for all edges into prioritized patients; this will help prioritized patients, but will likely lower overall efficiency (a tradeoff often described as the price of fairness (Caragiannis et al. 2009; Bertsimas et al. 2011b; Dickerson et al. 2014; McElfresh and Dickerson 2018) ).
To balance fairness with efficiency, policymakers limit the degree of prioritization. Let P Γ be a budgeted prioritization set, which bounds the sum of absolute differences between each w e andŵ e ; this prioritization set is given as:
As with edge weight uncertainty, the budget Γ balances between fairness and efficiency. If Γ is large, the algorithm might sacrifice matching size in order to match prioritized patients-but the maximum amount of efficiency sacrificed will be predictable, given Γ, which is attractive to policymakers. In Appendix C we further develop this concept, propose fairness rules that use P Γ , and present some theoretical results regarding the balance between fairness and efficiency.
Conclusions & Future Research
In this paper, we presented the first scalable robust formulations of kidney exchange. Our methods address both uncertainty over the quality and the existence of a potential transplant. On real and simulated data from a large, fielded kidney exchange, we showed that our methods (i) clear the market within seconds and (ii) result in more predictable and better quality matchings than the status quo.
Adapting automated ethical decision-making frameworks that aggregate noisy human value judgments (Noothigattu et al. 2018; Freedman et al. 2018; Bonnefon et al. 2016) into our robust formulation is a natural way to handle uncertainty in the weights determined by a committee of stakeholders. Approaching dynamic kidney exchange, where participants arrive and depart over time, via robust reinforcement learning methods would be fruitful (Lim et al. 2013; Xu and Mannor 2010 
A Edge Weight Robust Formulation
We develop an edge weight robust formulation with uncertainty set U I Γ , based on the position-indexed chain-edge formulation formulation (PICEF) introduced by Dickerson et al. (2016) . In Section A.1 we review the PICEF formulation, and in Section A.2 we introduce our linear formulation for edge-weight robust kidney exchange. Section A.3 and Section A.4 describe the solution methods for constant uncertainty budget Γ and variable uncertainty budget γ(|x|) for decision variables x, respectively.
For simplicity, we use the abbreviation KEX(U) to refer to the robust kidney exchange problem, with uncertainty set U.
A.1 PICEF Formulation
The position-indexed chain-edge formulation (PICEF) is a compact formulation proposed by Dickerson et al. (2016) , with a polynomial (with regard to the compatibility graph size and exogenous cycle cap) count of both variables and constraints. This formulation uses the following parameters:
• G: kidney exchange graph, consisting of edges e ∈ E and vertices v ∈ V = P ∪ N , including patient-donor pairs P and NDDs N • C: a set of cycles on exchange graph G • L: chain cap (maximum number of edges used in a chain)
• w e : edge weights for each edge e ∈ E • w C c : cycle weights for each cycle c ∈ C, defined as w C c = e∈c w e This formulation uses one decision variable for each cycle, and several decision variables for each edge to represent chains:
• z c ∈ {0, 1}: 1 if cycle c is used in the matching, and 0 otherwise • y ek ∈ {0, 1}: 1 if edge e is used at position k in a chain, and 0 otherwise Note that edges between an NDD n ∈ N and a patient-donor vertex v ∈ P may only take position 1 in a chain, while edges between two patient-donor pairs may take any position 1, 2, . . . , L in a chain. For convenience, we define the function K for each edge e, such that K(e) is the set of all possible positions that edge e may take in a chain.
K(e) = {1} e begins in n ∈ N {1, 2, . . . , L} e begins in v ∈ P We also use the following notation for flow into and out of vertices: 
s.t.
The Objective (5a) maximizes the total weight of a matching, defined by the cycle decision variables z c and edge variables y ek . Feasible matchings may only use each edge once, and must contain valid chains. Capacity constraints ensure that each edge is used at most once: The capacity constraints for each vertex are as follows:
• Constraint 5b: each patient-donor vertex i ∈ P may only participate in one cycle or one chain • Constraint 5c: each NDD i ∈ N may only participate in one chain Valid chains must begin in an NDD, and conserve flow through patient-donor pairs:
• Constraint 5d: a patient-donor vertex i ∈ P can only have an outgoing edge at position k + 1 in a chain if it has an incoming edge at position k
In the next section we present the mixed integer linear program formulation for KEX(U I Γ ), based on PICEF.
A.2 Our Robust Formulation
To simplify notation, let M P be the set of all feasible matchings for the PICEF formulation. The edge weight robust kidney exchange problem KEX(U I Γ ) is given in Equation (6). 
Next we develop a MILP formulation for Problem 7 by directly minimizing its Objective (7a). This minimum occurs when Γ edge weights are reduced by d e , and one edge weight is reduced by (Γ − Γ )d e . For this reason we refer to d e as the discount value of edge e, and all edges that receive reduced weight in the robust matching are discounted.
For simplicity, we define a variableŷ e for each edge e ∈ E such thatŷ e is 1 if edge e is used in the matching, and 0 otherwise. Note that edge e is used in the matching if it is used in a chain (i.e. any y ek = 1), or if it is used in a cycle (i.e. z c = 1 for any cycle c containing e). Thus we define variablesŷ e using the following constraint.
k∈K(e) y ek + c∈C:e∈c z c =ŷ e , e ∈ Ê y e ∈ {0, 1}, e ∈ E Next we minimize the Objective (7a)w.r.t. U I1 Γ , by discounting up to Γ edges. Note that if only G < Γ edges are used in a matching, only G edge weights may be discounted. Thus let Γ ≡ min{G, Γ} be the number of discounted edges, with
the total number of edges used in the matching. To linearize the definition of Γ we introduce variable h, which is 1 if G < Γ and 0 otherwise. The statement Γ = min (G, Γ) can be linearized using the following constraints,
where W is a large constant. The objective of Problem (7) is minimized the the Γ discounted edges are those with the largest discount value d e . To select these edges we introduce variables g e ∈ {0, 1} for each edge e ∈ E. Let m be the smallest d e of any discounted edge-that is, m is the Γ th highest d e of any edge used in the matching. We define g e as follows
That is, g e is 0 if d e is smaller than the Γ th highest discount value of edges used in the matching, and 1 otherwise. We can define these variables using linear constraints in two steps. First, note that variables g e and d e must obey the same ordering relation. That is, g i ≥ g j ⇔ d i ≥ d j must hold for all i, j ∈ E, i = j. Note that variables d e are constant, and can be sorted during pre-processing. Let ≥ d indicate this ordering relation.
Next we ensure that only Γ edges are discounted. Note thatŷ e = 1 implies that edge e is used in the matching. Edge e should be discounted if it is used in the matching, and if d e is above the minimum discount value (that is, g e = 1). Thus, edge e should be discounted if the following identity holds g eŷe = 1
Using this observation, we can ensure that exactly Γ edges are discounted with the following constraint,
For any feasible matching M = (y, z), we can directly solve the minimization in Problem (7) by discounting the Γ edges used in M with the largest discount values. This is accomplished using variables g e ; Equation (8) gives the solution of this minimization when Γ is integer, which is expressed as a function Z(y, z); the next section extends this formulation to accommodate non-integer Γ.
k∈K(e)
Note that this formulation contains two sets of quadratic terms: g e y ek for k ∈ K(e) for e ∈ E, and g e z c for c ∈ C and e ∈ E. We linearize these terms in the following section, after considering non-integer Γ.
Non-Integer Γ The number of discounted edges Γ may be integer or non-integer valued. When Γ is not integer valued, up to Γ edges are fully discounted by value d e , and the edge with the smallest discount value is discounted by (Γ − Γ )d e . We include this fractional discount by using two sets of indicator variables g f e and g p e for all e ∈ E, and then discount each edge e as follows:
• e is fully discounted if g Thus if Γ is integer, g f e = g p e for all e ∈ E; if Γ is not integer, then Γ matching edges should be at least partially discounted (g p e = 1), and Γ matching edges should be fully discounted (g p e = g f e = 1). These indicator variables are defined in the same way as g e in Equation (8): g f e , g p e ∈ {0, 1}, and they obey the same ordering relation as d e . However, the number of matching edges with g f e = 1 can be different than the number of edges with g p e = 1. First note that Γ matching edges must have g p e = 1. Recall that G is the number of matching edges, and Γ = min(Γ, G); if Γ < G, then Γ = Γ , and otherwise Γ = G. The variable h is defined to be 1 if G < Γ and 0 otherwise. Thus, we use the following constraint to require that Γ matching edges have g p e = 1:
Similarly, we can require that Γ edges have g , e ∈ Ê g p e ∈ {0, 1}, e ∈ E To linearize the term hG, we introduce variableĝ ≡ hG, which is defined using the following constraints. As before, W is a large constant.ĥ
Finally, for any feasible matching M = (y, z), we can directly solve the minimization in problem 7 by discounting the Γ edges used in M with the largest discount values. This is accomplished using variables g 
Equation (9) is the direct minimization of the Objective of KEX(U I1 Γ ) (7a). Thus we directly apply this minimization solution to the original Problem (7), to obtain the final linear formulation in Equation (10). 
A.3 Solution Method for Constant Budget Γ
This section describes the algorithm for solving the edge-weight robust formulation in Section A.2, when it is unreasonable to find all cycles in the exchange graph during preprocessing. We build on the cycle pricing method in Dickerson et al. (2016) , which in turn built on corrected versions of methods presented by Glorie et al. (2014) and Plaut et al. (2016) . This method begins by solving the LP relaxation of Problem (10) on a reduced model (using a small number of cycles), and then identifying positive-price cycles-which may improve the solution-and adding these to the model. If no positive-price cycles exist, then the solution is optimal on the reduced LP relaxation. This process is known as the pricing problem.
After optimizing the reduced LP relaxation, we proceed in one of two ways 1. If the solution is fractional, then we fix one of the fractional variables and branch, as in a standard branch-and-bound tree, 2. If the solution is integral, then it is the optimal solution to Problem (10).
This combination of cycle pricing and branch-and-bound is known as branch-and-price. Algorithm 1 is the branch-and-price method for solving Problem (10). There are only two inputs to this algorithm: the kidney exchange graph G, and the set of fixed decision variables X F . At each branch in the search tree, a new decision variable is fixed to either 0 or 1 and added to X F . When both 1) no positive price cycles exist for reduced model M and solution X, and 2) the solution X is integral, then X is returned.
The branch-and-price method in Algorithm 1 requires a cycle-pricing algorithm GetCycles. This algorithm either returns positive-price cycles-using the reduced model M and the current solution to the LP relaxation, X-or determines that none exist. We adapt the cycle-pricing algorithm usesd by Dickerson et al. (2016) to solve the PICEF formulation, which is based on (Glorie et al. 2014) and (Plaut et al. 2016) . These algorithms calculate the price p c of cycle c as
where w e is the weight of edge e in cycle c, and δ e is the dual value of the vertex where e ends. In the edge-weight robust problem, each edge e may receive its nominal weight w e or its discounted weight (w e − d e ). It is not obvious whether the nominal or discounted weights should be used during cycle pricing.
To illustrate this problem, assume we know the optimal solution X to Problem (10), and the set of cycles C used in X. We consider two methods for cycle pricing. 
Find fractional binary variable Xi ∈ X closest to 0.5; BranchAndPrice(G, XF ∪ (Xi = 0)); BranchAndPrice(G, XF ∪ (Xi = 1)); else return X 1. Calculate cycle prices using discounted edge weights (w e − d e ).
Assume that, for some cycle c ∈ C, none of the edges in c are discounted in X. During branch-and-price, it may occur that-before adding c to the reduced model-the following inequalities hold
If discounted edge weights are used during pricing, c appears to have negative price-and will not be added to the reduced model. In this case, the calculated price is incorrectly negative, branch-and-price may return a sub-optimal solution. 2. Calculate cycle prices using nominal edge weights w e .
Assume that, for some cycle c ∈ C, all of the edges in c are discounted when it is added to the reduced model. It may occur that the following inequalities hold:
In this case, using nominal edge weights for cycle pricing will incorrectly determine that c has a positive price, and will add c to the reduced model.
Neither of these methods is ideal-using discounted weights can result in a sub-optimal solution, while using nominal weights adds cycles to the reduced model. Instead, we calculate cycle prices using discounted edge weights only for edges that will be discounted in any matching, and nominal edge weights for all other edges. As discussed in Section A.2, up to Γ edges are discounted in every solution to Problem (10); these are the edges with the largest discount values d e . For any exchange graph with |E| edges, the min(Γ, |M |) edges with the largest discount values are always discounted if they are used in a solution to Problem (10). Algorithm 2 describes this method, which uses the cycle pricer of (Glorie et al. 2014) as a subroutine. Proposition 2 states that this method never incorrectly determines that a cycle has negative price-and therefore never results in a sub-optimal solution. Proposition 2. Algorithm 2 never determines that a positive-price cycle has a negative price.
A.4 Solution Method for Variable Budget γ
In this section we describe a method for solving the edge-weight robust kidney exchange problem with variable budget, KEX(U I1 γ ). Theorem 2 is a direct adaptation of Theorem 4 of (Poss 2014) to the edge-weight uncertain kidney exchange problem, which states that the solution of KEX(U I1 γ ) can be found by solving several cardinality-restricted instances of
return PositivePriceCycles(G, L, X, w * e ), the cycle pricer from (Glorie et al. 2014) Theorem 2. Let M be the set of feasible matchings, with edge decision variables x ∈ M ⊂ {0, 1} |E| . The solution to KEX(U I1 γ ) can be found by solving |E| cardinality-restricted instances of KEX(U I1 Γ ), max min
with k = 1, . . . , |E|, and taking the maximum-weight solution.
The proof of this theorem is identical to the proof of Theorem 4 in Poss (2014), and is omitted here. In practice, feasible matchings use far fewer than |E| edges, and thus many fewer than |E| instances of KEX(U I1 Γ ) must be solved. Algorithm 3 describes our method for solving KEX(U I1 γ ), which first finds the maximum cardinality matching, and then solves each cardinality-restricted problem KEX(U I1 Γ ).
ALGORITHM 3: EdgeWeightRobust-γ input :Function γ, exchange graph G output :Optimal matching x Find the maximum cardinality matching xC ;
, restricting cardinality to k; end return The maximum-weight matching in {x * k }
B Edge Existence Robust Formulation
In this section we develop an edge existence robust formulation for kidney exchange, using uncertainty set U w Γ . Our approach is based on a formulation introduced by Anderson et al. (2015) , which adapts a formulation of the prize-collecting traveling salesman problem (PC-TSP). For simplicity, we use the abbreviation KEX(U) to refer to the robust kidney exchange problem, with uncertainty set U.
B.1 PC-TSP Formulation
We begin by overviewing the PC-TSP method proposed by Anderson et al. (2015) ; it is based on a method for solving the prize-collecting traveling salesman problem (PC-TSP) introduced by Balas (1989) . We use a version of the PC-TSP formulation with a finite chain cap; the uncapped formulation is much more compact. (Due to high failure rates, most fielded exchanges incorporate a finite maximum length of chains. That cap can be quite high, e.g., 20 or more, but is typically not allowed to float freely with parts of the input size, e.g., |V |.) This formulation is especially useful because it allows us to define decision variables equal to each chain weight used in the matching, without explicitly enumerating all possible chains.
This formulation uses all of the same parameters as PICEF: • G: kidney exchange graph, consisting of edges e ∈ E and vertices v ∈ V = P ∪ N , including patient-donor pairs P and NDDs N .
• C: a set of cycles on exchange graph G.
• L: chain cap (maximum number of edges used in a chain).
• w e : edge weights for each edge e ∈ E.
• w C c : cycle weights for each cycle c ∈ C, defined as w C c = e∈c w e . PC-TSP uses one decision variable for each cycle (z c ) and each edge (y e ), and several auxiliary decision variables that help define the constraints:
• z c ∈ {0, 1}: 1 if cycle c is used in the matching, and 0 otherwise.
• y e ∈ {0, 1}: 1 if edge e is used in a chain, and 0 otherwise.
• y n e ∈ {0, 1}: 1 if edge e is used in a chain starting with NDD n, and 0 otherwise.
• w N n (auxiliary): total weight of the chain starting with NDD n.
• f i v and f o v (auxiliary): chain flow into and out of vertex v ∈ P , respectively.
• f i,n v and f i,n v (auxiliary): chain flow into and out of vertex v ∈ P , respectively, from a chain beginning with NDD n ∈ N . The PC-TSP formulation with chain cap L is given in Problem 12. As before, we use the notation δ − (v) for the set of edges into vertex v and δ + (v) for the set of edges out of v.
The objective 12a maximizes the total weight of a matching, defined by the cycle decision variables z c and edge decision variables y e . The auxiliary variables are defined using the following constraints:
• Constraint 12b: defines w N n .
• Constraint 12c: defines y e , using y n e .
• Constraints 12d and 12e: define auxiliary variables f • Constraint 12i: each NDD n may only start one chain.
The follow constraints ensure that chain flow is conserved, and enforce the chain cap L: • Constraint 12k: chains can use no more than L edges.
• Constraint 12l: chain flow out of v can only be nonzero if there is chain flow out of v. This constraint is equivalent to 12h, but for variables f o,n v . The final constraints ensure that each chain includes an NDD. These are very similar to the generalized subtour elimination constraints in the TSP literature.
• Constraint 12j: for every subset S of the donor-patient vertices, each vertex in S can only participate in a chain if there is chain flow into S.
The number of constraints in 12j grows exponentially with the number of patient-donor vertices, so it is necessary to use constraint generation with the PC-TSP formulation. We avoid constraint generation by developing a new formulation, which draws on concepts of both PC-TSP and PICEF; this formulation is introduced in the following section.
B.2 Our PI-TSP Formulation
In this section we present the new position-indexed PC-TSP formulation (PI-TSP), which combines concepts from both the PC-TSP formulation and the PICEF formulation. The main advantage of our approach is in the formulation of chains. PC-TSP uses a fixed number of decision variables to allow long (or uncapped) chains, but requires constraint generation. PICEF does not require constraint generation, but the number of decision variables grows polynomially with the chain cap.
Our approach achieves the best of both worlds: PI-TSP uses a fixed number of decision variables for any chain cap, and does not require constraint generation. To our knowledge, ours is the first formulation to exhibit this behavior.
PI-TSP uses the same parameters as PICEF and PC-TSP: • G: kidney exchange graph, consisting of edges e ∈ E and vertices v ∈ V = P ∪ N , including patient-donor pairs P and NDDs N .
• w C c : cycle weights for each cycle c ∈ C, defined as w C c = e∈c w e . PI-TSP also uses the same decision variables (and auxiliary variables) as PC-TSP. Two additional variables are added to the formulation: p e , p v ≥ 1 for each edge e ∈ E and patient-donor vertex v ∈ P , to represent e and v's position in a chain.
• p e ≥ 1: the position of edge e in any chain.
• p v ≥ 1: the position of patient-donor vertex v in any chain (equal to the position of any incoming edge).
•p e ≥ 0: equal to p e if e is used in a chain, and 0 otherwise. (i.e.p e = p e · y e ) • z c ∈ {0, 1}: 1 if cycle c is used in the matching, and 0 otherwise.
• f 
e ∈ E (13k)
e ∈ E, n ∈ N (13r)
All constraints are identical to those of PC-TSP, but without the subtour elimination constraints 12j, and with the addition of the following constraints:
• Constraints 13j: sets p e = 1 for all edges out of NDD vertices.
• Constraints 13k: definesp e .
• Constraints 13l: for all vertices v, sets p v equal to the variable p e of any incoming edge.
• Constraints 13m: for all outgoing edges of all vertices v, sets p e = p v + 1.
Two adjustments may be made to this formulation: first, the variables p v are not necessary, but are useful for illustration. We can remove these variables by combining Constraints 13l and 13m as follows:
Second, Constraints 13k are nonlinear; we linearize these by replacing 13k with the following constraints for each e ∈ E: p e ≤ y e M p e ≤ p e p e − (1 − y e )M ≤p e Experiments: Minimum Chain Length We demonstrate the utility of the PI-TSP formulation by finding optimal matchings with a minimum chain length (L min ). We set a maximum chain length of L max = 3, and vary the L min from 0 to 3. For some exchange graph, let |M OP T | be the score of the optimal matching (i.e. with no minimum chain length, and maximum chain length 3); we calculate the fractional optimality gap for the matching M l (with score |M l |), which has minimum chain length
We calculate optimal matchings for L min = 0, 1, 2, 3, for each of the UNOS exchange graphs used in Section 5. Only 154 of the roughly 300 UNOS graphs contain chains; the remaining graphs may have no NDDs, or the NDDs may have no feasible donors. Focusing on these 154 graphs, we calculate ∆OP T and the chain lengths of each optimal matching, for each L min . Figure 4 shows histograms of ∆OP T and the chain lengths for all optimal matchings, for each L min = 0, 1, 2, 3. Note that ∆OP T is zero for L min = 0, by definition. For some of these exchanges, a minimum chain length of 2 or 3 was infeasible (58 for L min = 2, and 77 for L min = 3, out of 154 total exchanges); we do not consider these cases.
As expected, enforcing L min > 0 results in longer chains -such that when L min = L max = 3, all chains have length 3. Surprisingly, enforcing a minimum chain length does not impact the overall matching score. Indeed, even when L min = 3, 70% of all matchings have a zero optimality gap. However these experiments did not consider edge failures. As discussed in Section 4, edge failures impact long cycles and chains more than short cycles and chains; in practice, when edges have a nonzero failure probability, setting a high L min makes the matching more susceptible to failure (i.e. less robust).
B.3 Edge Existence Robust Formulation
In this section we develop a mixed integer linear program formulation for the edge existence robust kidney exchange (KEX(U w Γ )). This problem maximizes the matching score while minimizing the objective with respect to realized cycle and chain weightŝ w M c for the current matching M . We develop an edge-existence robust formulation by directly minimizing the PI-TSP Objective (13a) over all cycle and chain weight realizations in U w Γ . For brevity, let M P be the set of all possible feasible solutions to the PI-TSP formulation; we represent these feasible solutions as (y, z) ∈ M, where y are the edge decision variables for chains, and z are the cycle decision variables.
For any feasible solution (y, z) ∈ M P , we find the minimum objective value for any realized cycle and chain weights in U w Γ With some abuse of notation, this minimum is represented by the function Z(y, z). In this section we separate the realized weightsŵ c into the realized cycle weightsŵ • If Γ = 1, the largest decrease in matching weight occurs if the highest weight cycle or chain is discounted -that is, if R contains the first edge in the highest weight chain, or any edge in the highest weight cycle.
• Similarly if Γ = 2, the largest decrease in matching weight occurs when the two highest-weight cycles and chains are discounted.
Thus, for any positive Γ and any feasible matching M , the minimum objective in KEX(U E Γ ) occurs when the Γ highest-weight cycles and chains in M are discounted.
In KEX(U w Γ ), for any Γ and any feasible matching M , the minimum occurs (trivially) when the Γ highest-weight cycles or chains are discounted in U w Γ . For any matching M , minimizing the KEX objective over U E and U w Γ produce the same outcome -the Γ highest-weight cycles and chains are discounted. Thus, the minimization in KEX(U E ) and KEX(U w Γ ) is equivalent. Thus, to solve the constant-budget edge existence robust kidney exchange problem, we can solve Problem (14) -which maximizes Z(y, z) over all feasible matchings (y, z) ∈ M P .
We proceed by solving Problem (14), which is equivalent to KEX(U w Γ ). To solve this problem we first develop a linear formulation for Z using the PC-TSP decision variables, and then we maximize this linear expression.
B.4 Linear Formulation for Z
In this section we minimize the function Z for any matching (y, z) ∈ M P , within uncertainty set U w Γ . Within this uncertainty set, up to Γ cycles and chains can have zero realized weight (i.e.ŵ c = 0), and if Γ is not integer, then one cycle or chain will have realized weight equal to the fraction (Γ − Γ ) of its total nominal weight (i.e.ŵ c = (Γ − Γ )w c . We say that any cycle or chain c withŵ c < w c is discounted.
First note that if a matching uses G cycles and chains, and G < Γ, only G objects are discounted. Thus let Γ = min{G, Γ} be the number of discounted cycles and chains, i.e.,
To linearize the definition of Γ , we introduce variable h, which is 1 if G < Γ and 0 otherwise. The statement Γ = min{G, Γ} is linearized using the following constraints:
where W is a large constant. The function Z is minimized w.r.t. the realized weights, when the Γ discounted cycles and chains are those with the largest weight. To select these objects we introduce variables g C c , g N n ∈ {0, 1} for each cycle c ∈ C and each chain's NDD n ∈ N . For any matching, let m be the smallest weight of any discounted cycle or chain -that is, m is the Γ th highest weight of any cycle or chain used in the matching. We define g . That is, we require that variables g {C,N } obey the same ordering as w {C,N } . This ordering requirement can be defined using the following correspondences
Note that cycle weights are fixed but chain weights depend on the decision variables. Thus we determine ordering relation 15 by sorting all cycle weights during preprocessing, and enforcing this ordering over g C i using the relation ≥ C , defined as
Using this notation, the ordering relation ≥ C contains all pairs of cycles (a, b) such that w This ordering relation is enforced on variables g C i using (|C| − 1) constraints. The ordering required by correspondence 16, 17, and 18 depend on the chain weights, which in turn depend on decision variables. We can linearize these correspondences using the following inequalities
Where W is a large constant. When w 
Next we require that only Γ objects are discounted. Note that if cycle c is discounted if g y n e = 1. Thus, the following identity requires that exactly Γ objects are discounted:
We use these variables to directly minimize Z(y, z) w.r.t. U w Γ , and the result is given in Equation (19).
Note that there are two sets of quadratic expressions in this formulation: g C c z c , and w N n g N n . These are linearized in the next section, which addresses non-integer Γ.
B.5 Non-Integer Γ When Γ is not integer, the actual number of discounted cycles and chains (Γ ) may be integer or non-integer valued. When Γ is not integer valued, up to Γ cycles and chains are fully discounted (i.e.ŵ c = 0), and the smallest-weight cycle or chain is discounted by fraction (Γ − Γ ). We include this fractional discount by using two sets of indicator variables f {C,N } i and p {C,N } i for all cycles and chains i ∈ C ∪ N , and then discount each i as follows: 
Similarly, the following constraint requires that Γ cycles and chains have f 
Where W is a large constant. When w As before, correspondence 15, the ordering between cycle indicator variables, is enforced using the pre-determined ordering
Objective for non-integer Γ. Using these indicator variables, the new objective of the robust formulation is To linearize the term hG, we introduce variableĝ ≡ hG, which is defined using the following constraints. As before, W is a large constant.ĥ ≤ hŴ
Finally, we introduce the variables F n ≡ f N n e∈δ + (n) y e and P n ≡ p N n e∈δ + (n) y e , defined with the following constraints. Note that for each NDD n ∈ N the sum of all y e variables is either zero (if n does not initiate a chain) or 1 (if n initiates a chain). Thus F n and P n are products of binary variables, which we define using the following constraints.
y e P n ≥ e∈δ + (n) y e + p N n − 1 , n ∈ N P n ∈ {0, 1}, n ∈ N Linear formulation. Finally, for any feasible matching we directly minimize Z by discounting the Γ largest-weight cycles and chains. This is accomplished using the variablesf , c ∈ C, n ∈ N (20e)
20p) F n ∈ {0, 1}, n ∈ N (20q) P n ∈ {0, 1}, n ∈ N (20r) q N ij ∈ {0, 1}, i, j ∈ N, i = j (20s) q cn ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ C, n ∈ N (20t) h ∈ {0, 1} (20u) The linear formulation for KEX(U w Γ ) is obtained by adding the PI-TSP constraints to Problem (20) , and mazimizing the objective 20a.
This linear formulation can be solved by any standard solver; our experiments use Gurobi (Gurobi Optimization, Inc. 2018).
C.2 Fairness Through Robustness
In this section we adapt the concept of budgeted uncertainty to apply budgeted prioritization to highly sensitized patients in kidney exchange. To prioritize certain patients over others, we assign each edge e ∈ E a priority weightŵ e ∈ [0, ∞), equal to the nominal weight multiplied by a factor (1 + α e ), with α e ∈ [−1, ∞). There are many ways to prioritize highly sensitized vertices using priority weights: we may set α > 0 for all edges in E H , or we may set α = −1 for edges in E L , and so on. To balance fairness with efficiency it reasonable to limit the degree of prioritization. To limit prioritization, we define a budgeted prioritization set P, which bounds the sum of absolute differences between each w e andŵ e ; this prioritization set is given in Equation (22). P Γ = ŵ |ŵ e = w e (1 + α e ), α e ∈ [−1, ∞], e∈E α e w e ≤ Γ
To prioritize V H , we define α e differently for each edge e. In one type of approach, we prioritize V H by setting α e to a constant (α) for all e ∈ E H . This approach is given by P + Γ , in Equation (23) P + Γ = ŵ |ŵ e = w e (1 + α) if e ∈ E H w e otherwise , α ≥ 0, α e∈E w e ≤ Γ
A different type of approach prioritizes V H by reducing all edges into E L ; this approach is given by P − Γ , in Equation (24).
To apply prioritization to kidney exchange, we either minimize or maximize the kidney exchange objective with respect to P. By choosing α e and prioritization budget Γ, this general framework can implement a wide variety of prioritization requirements. Next we show how budgeted prioritization generalizes a previous fairness rule.
C.3 Weighted Fairness
Weighted fairness was proposed by Dickerson et al. (2014) to prioritize highly sensitized patients in kidney exchange. This fairness rule maximizes the total matching weight, after multiplying all edge weights into highly sensitized patients by a factor (1 + γ), where parameter γ is set by policymakers. Weighted fairness is equivalent to maximizing the kidney exchange objective over the budgeted prioritization set P w , given below. This prioritization set is equivalent to P + Γ , with prioritization budget Γ equal to γ times the total weight received by highly sensitized patients.
